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REGULATING CLINICAL TRIALS IN INDIA: THE ECONOMICS OF 
ETHICS 
ABSTRACT 
The relationship between the ethical standards for the governance of clinical 
trials and market forces can be complex and problematic. This article uses 
India as a case study to explore this nexus. From the mid-2000s, India became 
a popular destination for foreign-sponsored clinical trials. The Indian 
government had sought to both attract clinical trials and ensure these would 
be run in line with internationally accepted ethical norms. Reports of 
controversial medical research, however, triggered debate about the 
robustness and suitability of India’s regulatory system. In response to civil 
society pressure and interventions by the Supreme Court, the Indian 
government proposed additional measures aimed at strengthening protections 
for clinical trial participants. Whilst the reforms can be seen as a victory for 
human rights activists, they have also been criticised as being overly 
burdensome for sponsors. Indeed, their announcement prompted an exodus 
of clinical trials from India. Fearful of losing business to ‘rival’ countries, the 
Indian government is revisiting some of its proposals.  
    The Indian example suggests that research ethics frameworks and national 
policies for economic development are increasingly intertwined. Host 
countries are in theory free to improve the lot of research participants, but 
doing so may make them appear less attractive to foreign sponsors, who can 
simply shift their activities to more industry-friendly jurisdictions. Although 
these economic pressures are unlikely to lead to a regulatory ‘race to the 
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bottom’, they may limit host countries’ ability to enact socially desirable 
reforms.  
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
From the early 1990s onwards, pharmaceutical companies and public sector 
researchers began shifting clinical trials from the well-established regions of 
North America and Western Europe to other locations; including India, China 
and countries within South America and Eastern Europe.1 This trend - known 
as the ‘globalisation of clinical trials’ 2  - is driven largely by economic 
considerations. 3  When compared to the ‘traditional’ regions, emerging 
countries offer significant savings, due in part to cheaper labour costs. 
Furthermore, faster patient recruitment helps speed up the process of 
completing trials and bringing new drugs to market. Offshoring and 
outsourcing are facilitated by contract research organisations (CROs); 
independent companies which can organise and run trials on the sponsor’s 
behalf. 
    Far from being mere passive recipients, host countries may seek actively 
to attract medical research. There are clear incentives for doing so. As well as 
                                                          
1 A. Petryna. 2009. When Experiments Travel: Clinical Trials and the Global Search for 
Human Subjects. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
2 Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General (OIG). 2001. The 
Globalization of Clinical Trials: A Growing Challenge in Protecting Human Subjects. 
Washington, DC: OIG. Available at: https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-00-00190.pdf 
[Accessed 20 Feb 2017]. 
3 T. Lang & S. Siribaddana. Clinical Trials Have Gone Global: Is This a Good Thing? PLoS 
Med 2012; 9: e1001228;  
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bringing in large sums of money and increasing employment, exposing local 
doctors to cutting-edge practices may help strengthen a country’s own 
medical research base and its domestic pharmaceutical industry.4 
     At the same time, responsible host countries must also protect the rights 
of their citizens. Medical research involving human subjects has a chequered 
history. Past examples of unethical abuses usually feature asymmetries of 
power and weak regulatory oversight as background factors.5 Both elements 
may be present in developing countries with little prior experience of medical 
research. Much of the academic discussion to date has therefore flagged the 
globalisation of clinical trials as a potential human rights concern. 6 
Commentators have underscored the need for host countries to establish 
robust regulatory systems and uphold appropriate ethical standards.7  
    As yet, however, little attention has been given to the ways in which host 
countries are attempting to achieve the twin goals of attracting clinical trials 
and protecting research participants. Are the two objectives mutually 
supportive, or might they pull in different directions? Analysis of other policy 
domains (e.g. labour standards) suggests that the desire for national economic 
                                                          
4  S. Sariola et al. Big-pharmaceuticalisation: Clinical trials and Contract Research 
Organisations in India. Soc Sci Med 2015; 131: 239-246. 
5 A. Dhai. The Research Ethics Evolution: From Nuremberg to Helsinki. S Afr Med J 2014; 
104: 178–180.  
6 J.E. Jesus & E.S. Higgs. International Research Ethics: Progress but Not Perfection. Trends 
Mol Med 2002; 8: 93-95; Clinical Trials in India: Ethical Concerns. Bull WHO 2008; 86: 
581-582. 
7 S.W. Glickman, J.G. McHutchinson & E.D. Peterson. Ethical and Scientific Implications 
of the Globalization of Clinical Research. N Engl J Med 2009; 360: 816–823. 
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competitiveness can complicate the pursuit of more stringent regulations.8 It 
is therefore timely and important to assess whether a similar dynamic exists 
in the context of clinical trials and, if so, to consider its implications.  
    India offers an ideal case study with which to pursue this research theme. 
Within a relatively short period of time, India has witnessed a sudden boom 
in clinical trial activity followed by regulatory crisis, attempts at legal reforms 
and an exodus of clinical trials. This article draws out the tension between 
economics and ethics inherent within this narrative. The Indian example 
demonstrates that economic considerations are becoming an important factor 
in clinical trial regulation. It is not claimed that this policy dynamic is either 
entirely new9 or limited exclusively to developing countries.10 Rather, by 
offering the first application of this analytical lens to the Indian regulatory 
journey, the article shows how the intertwining of economic and ethics can 
unfold in different contexts in different ways.11 In addition, the paper aims to 
advance understanding of this policy dynamic through connection with other 
literature. The ‘race to the bottom’ hypothesis has been tested in relation to 
other policy domains, but has yet to be applied systematically to clinical trials. 
                                                          
8  R.B. Davies & K.C. Vadlamannati. A Race to the Bottom in Labour Standards? An 
Empirical Investigation. J Dev Econ 2013; 103: 1-14.  
9 T.L. Lai. Incorporating Scientific, Ethical and Economic Considerations into the Design of 
Clinical Trials in the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Sequential Approach. 1984 Commun Stat 
Theory Methods; 13: 2355-2368; N.G. de Santo et al., eds. 1997. Human Clinical Research: 
Economics and Ethics. Naples, Italy: Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici. 
10 A.S. Kesselheim & J. Avorn. New “21st Century Cures” Legislation: Speed and Ease vs 
Science. JAMA 2017; 317:581-582; A. Ward. 2016. Fast-track Drug Approval Schemes 
Signal More US-EU Collaboration. The Financial Times. 16 May. 
11 N. Homedes & A. Ugalde, eds. 2014. Clinical Trials in Latin America: Where Ethics and 
Business Clash. Springer. 
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By connecting hitherto disparate bodies of literature in a critical way, the 
article contributes to scholarship on the globalisation of clinical trials and also 
to more general regulatory debates. The paper’s main argument is that whilst 
commercial pressures are unlikely to lead to a straightforward race to the 
bottom, they may nevertheless limit a host country’s ability to adopt ethics 
regulations that cohere meaningfully with the health needs and interests of its 
citizens. The discussion is focussed on India, but given the parallels with other 
jurisdictions, the conclusions are of relevance to the promotion of fair and just 
clinical trial regulation in developing countries more broadly. 
 
THE INDIAN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR CLINICAL TRIALS  
 
The official position of the Indian government regarding the growth of its 
clinical trials service industry is difficult to ascertain. As yet, there have not 
been any overarching policy documents laying out a definitive stance. 
Nevertheless, insights can be gleaned from various sources. For example, in 
2006, as part of the submission of Five Year Plans to cover the period 2007-
2012, 12  two governmental Working Groups set out their views on the 
opportunities and risks presented. There were differences in perspectives, as 
well as overlaps.  
    The Working Group on Drugs and Pharmaceuticals was composed of 
representatives from government bodies and the Indian pharmaceutical 
                                                          
12 Government of India, Planning Commission. Eleventh Five Year Plans 2007-2012. 
Available at: http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/welcome.html 
[Accessed 20 February 2017].  
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industry.13 This group viewed economic growth as a core objective. Seen in 
this light, the global industry’s desire to contain the spiralling costs of clinical 
trials offered tremendous possibilities for India. Worldwide, the outsourcing 
market for research contracts and clinical trials was estimated at around 
US$60 billion at the end of 2005.14 India’s share of this market was thought 
to be around $US100 million and predicted to grow at the rate of 80%.15 
Clinical trials were thus framed as a major international business opportunity 
to be taken advantage of.  
    By contrast, the Working Group on Health Systems Research, Biomedical 
Research and Development and Regulation of Drugs and Therapeutics 
focussed more on addressing India’s urgent health challenges.16 It included 
representatives from government bodies, health research institutes and NGOs. 
Its report highlighted the heavy burdens of infectious and non-communicable 
diseases in India, lamenting the low levels of investment in public health and 
the unsatisfactory state of the health system. Set against this backdrop, 
medical research was seen as important for encouraging the development of 
drugs, medical devices and vaccines relevant to the health needs of India’s 
poor.17 The possibility of India becoming an international hub for clinical 
                                                          
13 Government of India, Planning Commission. 2006. Report of the Working Group on Drugs 
and Pharmaceuticals for the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2007-2012). Available at: 
http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/11thf.htm [Accessed 20 February 2017]. 
14 Ibid: 25. 
15 Ibid. 
16  Government of India, Planning Commission. 2006. Report of the Working Group on 
Health Systems Research, Biomedical Research and Development and Regulation of Drugs 
and Therapeutics: Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2007-2012). Available at: 
http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/11thf.htm [Accessed 20 February 2017]. 
17 Ibid: ii.  
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trials was welcomed, as it would give an opportunity to be at the forefront of 
drug discovery; presumably to the benefit of the Indian population.18 
    The working groups’ reports contained some conceptual tensions. For 
example, access to healthcare was cast ambiguously as both a serious problem 
and a helpful advantage. Inadequate spending on public health was criticised, 
yet the resulting high numbers of ‘treatment naïve’ patients was presented as 
a selling point. Indian patients would be eager to enrol in studies as a way to 
receive good quality medical care and dropout rates would be low.19 Whilst 
eliding the complex ethical concerns about structural exploitation that such 
observations raise, 20  both working groups emphasised the need for medical 
research to comply with “strict ethical norms”.21 But what kind of normative 
vision would be enshrined in the regulatory framework?  
    Some background details are useful for addressing this question. As in 
other countries, the Indian legislation establishes ground rules and allocates 
responsibilities to various bodies. The Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (as 
amended) confers powers to the relevant licensing authority, namely the 
Drugs Controller General of India (DCGI), for the approval of new drugs.22 
The DCGI heads the Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation (CDSCO); 
India's main regulatory body for pharmaceuticals and medical devices. 
CDSCO is itself part of the Indian Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. 
                                                          
18 Ibid: 32. 
19 Government of India, Planning Commission, op. cit. note 13, p. 63. 
20 K. Sunder Rajan. Experimental Values: Indian Clinical Trials and Surplus Health. New 
Left Review 2007; 45: 67-88. 
21 Government of India, Planning Commission, op. cit. note 16. p.10.  
22 Drugs and Cosmetics Act 1940 (as amended up to the 31st December 2016). Available at: 
http://www.cdsco.nic.in/forms/contentpage1.aspx?lid=1888 [Accessed 20 February 2017]. 
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The Drugs and Cosmetics Act also grants authority to the central government 
to create more detailed secondary legislation. This resulted in the Drugs and 
Cosmetics Rules, 1945 (as amended).23 In 1988, Schedule Y was added to the 
Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, establishing the framework used by the DCGI 
when evaluating applications to commence trials.24 The 1988 version was 
created mainly with the Indian generic pharmaceutical industry in mind. In 
2005, however, Schedule Y was updated to position India as a player in the 
new era of globalised clinical trial activity. 25  
    A good starting point for understanding how ethical concerns were 
weighed against the goal of attracting clinical trials is the loosening of legal 
restrictions on the testing of drugs developed outside India. Previously, 
Schedule Y only permitted clinical trials of drugs developed abroad with a 
‘phase lag’, e.g. a phase II trial could be conducted in India only if a phase III 
trial had already been completed abroad.26 After 2005, Indian patients could 
be enrolled in phase II and III clinical trials of ‘foreign’ drugs. 27  Other 
administrative reforms were also aimed squarely at attracting trials. These 
included the speeding up of regulatory approvals before trials can commence, 
allowing the use of public hospitals as clinical trial sites and the abolition of 
                                                          
23 Drugs and Cosmetic Rules, 1945 (as amended up to 31st December 2016). Available at: 
http://www.cdsco.nic.in/forms/contentpage1.aspx?lid=1888 [Accessed 20 February 2017]. 
24 Drugs and Cosmetics (Eight Amendment) Rules, 1988, G.S.R. 944(E), 4.  
25 A. Bhatt. Evolution of Clinical Research: A History Before and Beyond James Lind. 
Perspect Clin Res 2010; 1: 6-10. 
26 Drugs and Cosmetics (Eight Amendment) Rules, 1988, G.S.R. 944 (E), Schedule Y, 1.1. 
27 Drugs and Cosmetics (IInd Amendment) Rules 2005, G.S.R. 32 (E), Schedule Y, 1(1)(iv).  
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relevant service taxes.28 Whilst not connected directly to encouraging clinical 
trials, changes to Indian patent law in 2005 were another key development. 
After accession to the World Trade Organization in 1995, India was required 
to allow product patents on pharmaceuticals. Although likely to exacerbate 
problems of access to medicines, product patents facilitated clinical trials by 
allowing sponsors to test drugs without fear of unauthorised copying. 
    The above reforms have been criticised for prioritising economic 
development over the interests of Indian patients.29 The force of this argument 
is, however, lessened by a number of protective measures that were also put 
in place. For example, Schedule Y only permits phase II or III trials of drugs 
discovered abroad if conducted concurrently with other global trials.30 Indian 
patients should therefore only be exposed to the levels of risks deemed 
acceptable in other, presumably well-regulated, jurisdictions. Second, foreign 
sponsors are generally not permitted to conduct phase I trials in India.31 This 
shows that the Indian government sought to shield its citizens by limiting their 
exposure to riskier ‘first-in-human’ studies, even if that would mean 
foregoing some economic benefits.  
                                                          
28 S. Srinivasan. The Clinical Trial Scenario in India. 2009. Economic and Political Weekly 
29August - 4 September; M. Imran et al. Clinical Research Regulation in India - History, 
Development, Initiatives, Challenges and Controversies: Still Long Way to Go. J Pharm 
Bioallied Sci 2013; 5: 2-9. 
29 V. Bajpai. Rise of Clinical Trials Industry in India: An Analysis. ISRN Public Health 2013; 
167059.  
30 Drugs and Cosmetic Rules, 1945 (as amended up to 31st December 2016), Schedule Y, 
1(1)(iv)(b). 
31 Ibid. 
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    Measures were also taken to increase regulatory oversight. Steps towards 
improving transparency and accountability were made in 2009 when the 
online registration of clinical trials in the Clinical Trials Registry - India 
(CTRI) became mandatory. 32  The ethics committee system was also 
overhauled. Previously, ethics committee approval before initiating a clinical 
trial was seen as “desirable” but not obligatory.33 If none of the institutions or 
sites involved in a clinical trial had an ethics committee in place, a trial 
protocol could simply be accepted by the investigator and the DCGI. Since 
2005, the DCGI has required the documented approval of a properly 
constituted ethics committee before it can allow a trial to begin.34 Ethics 
committees must now review clinical trial protocols35 with reference to three 
research guidelines: (i) the Declaration of Helsinki,36 (ii) the Indian Council 
for Medical Research’s (ICMR) Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research 
                                                          
32  Clinical Trials Registry - India. Available at: http://ctri.nic.in/Clinicaltrials/login.php 
[Accessed 20 February 2017]. 
33 Drugs and Cosmetics (Eight Amendment) Rules, 1988, G.S.R. 944 (E), 4.  
34 Drugs and Cosmetics (IInd Amendment) Rules 2005, G.S.R. 32 (E), 3(2). 
35 Drugs and Cosmetic Rules, 1945 (as amended up to 31st December 2016), Appendix II, 6. 
36  World Medical Association (WMA). 2013. WMA Declaration of Helsinki - Ethical 
Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects. Available at: 
http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/ [Accessed 20 February 2017]. 
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on Human Participants,37 and (iii) the Indian version of international Good 
Clinical Practice (GCP) guidelines.38  
    These changes to the ethics review process served two purposes. As well 
as promising tighter ethical safeguards, they helped transform India into a 
more credible destination for research. Compliance with GCP guidelines, in 
particular, is necessary to allow sponsors to use Indian clinical trial data to 
support applications to market drugs in the United States39 and the European 
Union.40 India’s adoption of international norms, inter alia, would reassure a 
global audience concerned about the commercial usability of data.  
    Yet having incorporating international guidelines, India was then faced 
with the question of how to manage any differences between them. The 
Declaration of Helsinki and GCP diverge on several topics, including the 
                                                          
37 Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR). 2006. Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical 
Research on Human Participants. New Delhi: ICMR. Available at: 
http://www.icmr.nic.in/ethical_guidelines.pdf [Accessed 20 February 2017]. 
38 Central Drugs Standard Control Organization (CDSCO). 2001. Good Clinical Practices 
for Clinical Research in India. Available at: http://www.cdsco.nic.in/html/GCP1.html 
[Accessed 20 February 2017]. 
39 United States Code of Federal Regulations. Revised as of 1 April 2016. Foreign Clinical 
Studies not Conducted under an IND, 21 CFR 312.120. Available at: 
https://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm126426.htm [Accessed 20 
February 2017]. 
40 Regulation (EC) No. 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 
2004 Laying down  Community  Procedures  for  the  Authorisation  and  Supervision  of  
Medicinal  Products for  Human  and  Veterinary  Use  and  Establishing  a  European  
Medicines  Agency, (16). Available at:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:136:0001:0033:en:PDF 
[Accessed 20 February 2017]. 
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much-debated issue of post-trial obligations. 41  Paragraph 30 of the 2000 
version of the Declaration of Helsinki states that at the end of the trial, every 
participant should be assured of access to the best proven prophylactic, 
diagnostic and therapeutic methods identified by the study.42 This prompted 
much international discussion due to the lack of even basic drugs in most 
developing countries. 43  In 2004, the World Medical Association (WMA) 
added a Note of Clarification on paragraph 30.44 This reaffirmed its earlier 
position regarding post-trial access and went further by stating that post-trial 
access arrangements or other care must be described in the study protocol so 
the ethical review committee may consider such arrangements during its 
review. Both the international45 and Indian versions of GCP guidelines,46 by 
contrast, are notably silent on this issue. When updating its own bespoke 
research guidelines in 2006, the ICMR opted to follow the more beneficent 
                                                          
41 L.J. Burgess & D. Pretorius. FDA abandons the Declaration of Helsinki: The Effect on the 
Ethics of Clinical Trial Conduct in South Africa and other Developing Countries. SAJBL 
2012; 5: 87-90. 
42  World Medical Association (WMA). 2000. WMA Declaration of Helsinki - Ethical 
Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects. Available at: 
http://www.who.int/bulletin/archives/79%284%29373.pdf [Accessed 20 April 2017].  
43 ICMR, op. cit. note 37, p. 30.  
44  World Medical Association (WMA). 2004. WMA Declaration of Helsinki - Ethical 
Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects. Available at: 
http://www.chrt.org.hk/english/service/files/app_6_cop.PDF [Accessed 20 April 2017].  
45 International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of 
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH). 1996. ICH Harmonised Tripartite Guideline: 
Guideline for Good Clinical Practice E6(R1). Available at: 
http://www.ich.org/fileadmin/Public_Web_Site/ICH_Products/Guidelines/Efficacy/E6/E6_
R1_Guideline.pdf [Accessed 20 April 2017]. 
46 CDSCO, op. cit. note 38. 
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approach taken in the 2004 version of the Declaration of Helsinki. Post-trial 
access to drugs ‘should’ be provided.47 Nevertheless, as in the Declaration of 
Helsinki itself, the language used was of strong recommendation rather than 
compulsion. Despite being confronted with the problem of access to 
medicines on the ground in India, the ICMR appears to have been reluctant 
to go beyond the Declaration of Helsinki by changing a ‘should’ to a ‘must’ 
and thereby imposing concrete post-trial obligations on sponsors.  
    On the issue of compensation for injury, however, the 2006 ICMR 
Guidelines did forge something of a new path. Whereas the 2004 version of 
the Declaration of Helsinki does not mention compensation, the ICMR 
Guidelines establish that sponsors should agree to provide compensation for 
any physical or psychological injury for which participants are entitled or 
agree to provide insurance coverage for an unforeseen injury whenever 
possible.48 The ICMR also recommended that an arbitration committee or 
appellate authority could be set up by the institution to decide on the issue of 
compensation on a case-by-case basis.49 The institutional independence of 
such bodies, however, was not stipulated clearly. Again, both mechanisms 
appear to be weakened by their framing as strong recommendations rather 
than as mandatory requirements. 
    Overall, the Indian government was attempting to strike a complex balance 
of interests. Its reforms contained both liberalising and protective features. 
On the one hand, Indian patients were being made more accessible to clinical 
                                                          
47 ICMR, op. cit. note 37, p. 30. 
48 ICMR, op. cit. note 37, p. 29.  Following the debates and legal reforms in India, a paragraph 
addressing the issue of compensation was later included in the 2013 version of the 
Declaration of Helsinki. WMA 2013, op. cit. note 36, para. 15. 
49 ICMR, op. cit. note 37, pp. 29-30. 
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trial sponsors and CROs, but important safeguards - such as the requirement 
for concurrent trials and restrictions on phase 1 trials - were also established. 
India’s ethics regime was brought into line with international standards 
through linkage with the Declaration of Helsinki and GCP, yet the 2006 
ICMR rules reflected the uncertainties and compromises within those 
guidelines on the vexed issue of post-trial access to drugs. The ICMR did lay 
down recommendations on the issue of compensation for injury at a time 
when the Declaration of Helsinki had nothing to say on this particular issue, 
but ambiguities in the phrasing of the rules seem to undercut their force.  
    In terms of real-world impact, the new regulatory framework was 
successful in luring clinical trials to India. According to DCGI figures, the 
number of clinical trial approvals shot from a mere three in 2007 to a 
highpoint of 500 in 2010.50 India’s growth, however, should be placed in 
context. Compared to other countries, its overall level of clinical trial activity 
was still relatively small. 51  Nevertheless, proof of concept had been 
established. India could now compete for an even larger share of the global 
market. Achieving this objective, however, would not be straightforward. 
Ethical controversies would later derail the government’s aspirations. 
 
CONTROVERSIAL MEDICAL RESEARCH 
 
                                                          
50  V.S. Chawan, K.V. Gawand & A.M. Phatak. Impact of New Regulations on Clinical Trials 
in India. Int J Clin Trials 2015; 2: 56-58. 
51  Pugatch Consilium. 2015. Quantifying the Economic Gains of Strengthening India’s 
Clinical Research Policy Environment. Available at: http://www.pugatch-
consilium.com/reports/Quantifying the Economic Gains from Strengthening the Clinical 
Research Policy Environment in India.pdf [Accessed 20 February 2017].  
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There is disagreement about the extent of the problem of non-compliance 
with clinical trial regulations in India. Some argue that the Indian regulatory 
system is not adequately geared towards protecting patients, who may be 
treated as ‘guinea pigs’ by unscrupulous operators.52 On the other side of the 
debate, it is asserted that the vast majority of Indian clinical trials are run 
conscientiously and in line with regulations.53 Even if a few ‘outliers’ can be 
identified, it is argued, comparable ethical lapses may also be found in other 
jurisdictions, including within North America or Europe.54 It follows that it 
would be wrong to portray India as inherently worse than other countries in 
terms of research ethics compliance. Whilst acknowledging the dangers of 
overgeneralisation, some problematic clinical trials are recounted below to 
give context to the later discussion regarding legal reforms.  
    According to news reports and legal submissions, victims of the 1984 
Bhopal gas explosion were enrolled in clinical trials at the Bhopal Memorial 
Hospital and Research Centre, often without their knowledge or informed 
consent. 55  When patients involved in trials died, investigations were not 
conducted by an independent body and nor was compensation offered to 
families of the deceased. Problems with informed consent also surfaced in a 
                                                          
52 S. Nundy & M.C. Gulhati. A New Colonialism? Conducting Clinical Trials in India. N 
Engl J Med 2005; 352: 1633-1636.  
53 K. Barnes. 2006. Indian Clinical Trials “Of No More Ethical Risk than in US”. 2006. 
Outsourcing-Pharma.com 22 September. Available at: http://www.outsourcing-
pharma.com/Clinical-Development/Indian-clinical-trials-of-no-more-ethical-risk-than-in-
US [Accessed 20 February 2017].   
54 Ibid. 
55 S. Chattopadhyay. Guinea Pigs in Human Form: Clinical Trials in Unethical Settings. 
Lancet 2012; 379: 26; N. Lakhani. 2011. From Tragedy to Travesty: Drugs Tested on 
Survivors of Bhopal. The Independent 15 November.  
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large-scale ‘observational study’ of vaccines for the prevention of Human 
Papilloma Virus (HPV). Vulnerable tribal girls in Andhra Pradesh and 
Gujarat were recruited into the study without proper parental consent.56 Seven 
girls who received vaccines died. Although a later Parliamentary committee 
concluded that the deaths were likely unrelated to the vaccines, strong 
criticisms were expressed about failures to follow informed consent 
procedures and the lax reporting of adverse events.57 The committee also 
stressed that the project should have been categorised as a phase IV clinical 
trial; with all the attendant procedural safeguards.  
    Such cases may reflect underlying issues within the regulatory system. 
Indian ethics committees are said to struggle with a lack of trained personnel, 
heavy workloads and inadequate support. 58  An ICMR survey has raised 
questions about appointment processes and more generally the independence 
and competence of some Indian ethics committees.59 For its part, the DCGI 
is said to lack sufficient manpower to cope with the sudden rise in clinical 
trial activity.60 Furthermore, once the DCGI has approved a clinical trial, it 
rarely follows up with inspections to ensure that regulations are being adhered 
                                                          
56 P. Bagla. Indian Parliament Comes Down Hard on Cervical Cancer Trial. Science 2013. 
Available at: http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2013/09/indian-parliament-comes-down-
hard-cervical-cancer-trial [Accessed 20 February 2017]. 
57 P. Shetty. Collapsed Trial Fuels Unfounded Vaccine Fears. Nature 2011; 474: 427-428. 
58 A. Jesani. Ethics in Ethics Committees: Time to Share Experiences, Discuss Challenges 
and Do a Better Job. Indian J Med Ethics 2009; 6: 62-63; R. Kadam and S. Karandikar. Ethics 
Committees in India: Facing the Challenges! Perspect Clin Res 2012; 3: 50-56;  
59 M. Desai. Ethics Committee: Critical Issues and Challenges. Indian J Pharmacol 2012; 
44: 663-664. 
60 B. Mamdani & M. Mamdani. Colonialism of Clinical Trials: Discerning the Positive Spin 
Offs. Indian J Med Ethics 2005; 2; 132-133: 132.  
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to.61 Grassroots activists have campaigned to change this general state of 
affairs. 
 
LEGAL REFORMS 
 
Several public interest litigation (PIL) petitions relating to clinical trials have 
been filed in the Indian Supreme Court.62 In terms of outcomes, the most 
significant to date was that brought by the Indore-based NGO Swasthya 
Adhikar Manch (SAM; ‘Health Right Forum’) in 2012.63 Highlighting the 
kinds of improper practices and harms to patients discussed above, the 
broadly-focused petition requested that the Supreme Court end the 
                                                          
61 R. Talele. Getting Ready for Inspection of Investigational Site at Short Notice. Perspect 
Clin Res 2010; 1: 64-66. 
62 C. Terwindt. Health Rights Litigation Pushes for Accountability in Clinical Trials in India. 
Health Hum Rights 2014; 16; E84-95. Available at: 
http://www.hhrjournal.org/2014/11/06/health-rights-litigation-pushes-for-accountability-in-
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exploitation of Indian patients and scrutinise whether the Indian regulatory 
system is fit for purpose.64 During the hearings, the Indian Ministry of Health 
and Family Welfare submitted an affidavit stating that between 2005 and 
2012, a total of 2868 clinical trials participants died.65 Of these, 89 deaths 
were considered to be related to trials and compensation was paid to relatives 
of the deceased in 82 cases.66 It appears that in the outstanding cases, the 
compensation remained unpaid because the investigator could not trace the 
whereabouts of the legal heirs.67 These statistics were summoned from the 
sponsors and collated by the CDSCO only after the Supreme Court PIL was 
filed. Prior to this, as of 2012, a smaller number of trial victims – just 22 - had 
received compensation, and these payments came after a committee chaired 
by Manekha Gandhi, Member of Parliament, had investigated the matter in 
2011.68  
    At the time of writing, the Supreme Court of India has not yet issued its 
final disposition in the case, but has given several interim orders that have 
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had a far reaching effect. 69  In January 2013, in an internationally 
unprecedented move, the Supreme Court suspended the commencement of 
new clinical trials until a new regulatory framework was established.70 The 
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare was required to bring clarity to the 
regime for ensuring that clinical trials are properly monitored and conducted 
in accordance with the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules. The government 
responded rapidly, making three amendments between January and February 
2013.71 These dealt, inter alia, with compensation for injured participants. A 
more stringent ‘three-tier’ system of government approval for clinical trials - 
consisting of a New Drugs Advisory Committee (NDAC), a Technical 
Committee and an Apex Committee - was also put in place.72  
    In a further order issued in July 2013, the Supreme Court suspended 162 
clinical trials that were already in progress.73 In October 2013, five of these 
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trials were allowed to resume because they had undergone the more rigorous 
three-tier process before DCGI approval. The remaining 157 trials were 
remanded back for approval under the new system.  
    The CDSCO had already received censure in 2012 with publication of a 
Parliamentary report describing a “collusive nexus” between industry, 
government and medical experts in relation to dubious drug approvals.74 
Facing widespread criticisms, the Indian government initiated a further raft 
of changes aimed at strengthening the regulatory framework for clinical trials. 
These came in the form of the Drugs and Cosmetics (Amendment) Bill, first 
presented to the Indian Parliament in August 2013,75 and a series of executive 
orders issued by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. 76  It is 
noteworthy that in early 2013 when the Indian government embarked on this 
process, neither the international or domestic ethics guidelines had much of 
substance to offer on the issues that were at the forefront of national debates; 
in particular, the broader social benefit gained by hosting clinical trials and 
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the need for causality assessments of injuries and deaths and related 
compensation, independent of the sponsor. The reforms were thus a fresh 
attempt to rethink the ethics rules so as to better serve the Indian national 
interest. Some key developments are summarised below. 
 
Ethics committees 
 
Ethics committees were the target of several reforms in the Drugs and 
Cosmetics (Amendment) Bill. In accordance with the recommendation of the 
Chaudhury Expert Committee report,77 ethics committees would need to be 
formally registered with the DCGI before they can review and approve 
clinical trials.78 Applications for registration must be made in accordance 
with defined criteria. Failure to comply with the conditions of registration 
could lead to authorisation being suspended or revoked. Other measures 
aimed to eliminate conflicts of interest amongst members79 and to encourage 
ethics committees to take a more pro-active role in supervising clinical trials 
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and protecting participants. 80  These changes all seem positive. Further 
research could examine the implementation of the reforms and their impact 
on the functioning of Indian ethics committees. 
 
Mandatory audio-video recordings of the informed consent 
process 
 
Prompted by an order of the Supreme Court of India, draft guidelines issued 
by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare in January 2014 require audio-
visual recording of the informed consent process. 81  This aims to protect 
participant autonomy, but has been criticised on the grounds that it will be 
burdensome for large-scale trials (e.g. vaccine trials), increase costs and go 
far beyond the international approach whereby informed consent is simply 
obtained in writing.82 Nevertheless, it has been argued that repeated violations 
of informed consent procedures justify a radical solution of this nature.83  
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Assessing clinical trial applications 
 
A further reform ordered by the Supreme Court and then approved by the 
Ministry of Health relates to so-called ‘Global Clinical Trials (GCTs)/New 
Clinical Trials (NCEs)’.84 Such trials must now be evaluated according to 
three parameters, namely: (i) assessment of risk versus benefit to the patients, 
(ii) innovation vis-à-vis existing therapeutic options and (iii) unmet medical 
need in the country. This innovative move was designed to ensure that clinical 
trials are of more relevance to India’s public health needs.85 There is, however, 
little guidance on what these terms actually mean or how they are to be 
assessed in practice, which could lead to uncertain and variable outcomes.86 
The extent to which these new principles would actually help advance the 
Indian national interest is also open to debate.  
 
Compensation  
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The most controversial aspect of the reform measures has been the shake-up 
of the framework regarding compensation for clinical trial-related injuries or 
death.87 On 30 January 2013, the Drugs and Cosmetics (First Amendment) 
Rules, 2013 came into force following notification of in the Gazette of India. 
88 Some of the changes brought to the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945, can 
be viewed as improvements. For example, the new regulations brought some 
clarity to the mechanisms for reporting adverse events to the Licensing 
Authority,89 assessment by an independent Expert Committee90 and ensuring 
that trial sponsors make prompt payment to participants - or their nominees - 
if clinical trial-related injuries or death occur.91  
    Other provisions in the Drugs and Cosmetics (First Amendment) Rules 
2013 are more questionable. First, a new rule stipulated that: “[i]n the case of 
an injury occurring to the clinical trial subject, he or she shall be given free 
medical management as long as required”. 92  This imprecise wording has 
raised concerns. Under one interpretation, the trial sponsor would be liable 
for the costs of medical care for the entirety of the participant’s lifetime, even 
if the injury was not actually caused by involvement in the trial e.g. if the 
participant was injured at work.93 A second provision stated, without any 
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further explanation, that subjects shall be eligible for compensation for “use 
of placebo in a placebo-controlled trial”.94 It is not clear if this rule was 
intended to eliminate placebo-controlled trials from India altogether, or if its 
aim was just to allow redress for patients injured as a result of inappropriate 
use of a placebo arm e.g. when they are deprived of their usual medication.95 
It should be noted that placebos can be an appropriate research methodology 
and are endorsed by the Declaration of Helsinki under limited 
circumstances.96 Third, an entitlement to compensation was established for 
“failure of an investigational product to provide the intended therapeutic 
effect”.97 This is problematic, because at the outset of a clinical trial, the 
product’s efficacy profile in humans is not fully known - hence the need for 
research. At least without further clarification and limitation, it is difficult to 
formulate a moral argument to justify forcing sponsors to guarantee a 
beneficial outcome. 98  These proposals have met with concerns and 
scepticism.99 
                                                          
94 Drugs and Cosmetics (First Amendment) Rules, 2013, G.S.R. 53 (E), op. cit. note 72, 
2(i)(5(d). 
95 M. Larkin. Acoustic Separation and Biomedical Research: Lessons from Indian Regulation 
of Compensation for Research Injury. J Law Med Ethics 2015; 43: 105-115. 
96 WMA Declaration of Helsinki 2013, op. cit. note 36, para. 33. 
97 Drugs and Cosmetics (First Amendment) Rules, 2013, G.S.R. 53 (E), op. cit. note 72, 
2(i)(5(c). 
98 Larkin, op. cit. note 95. 
99  M. Barnes et al. India’s Proposed Amendments to the Drug and Cosmetics Act: 
Compensation for Injuries to Clinical Trial Participants and the Criminalization of Clinical 
Research. Bloomberg BNA Life Sciences Law & Industry Report 2015.  
Available at: https://www.ropesgray.com/newsroom/news/2015/January/Health-Care-
Attorneys-Write-Bloomberg-BNA-Article.aspx [Accessed 20 February 2017].  
26 
 
 
THE EXODUS OF CLINICAL TRIALS FROM INDIA 
 
The recent policy changes have contributed to a drastic fall in the number of 
clinical trials conducted in India.100 According to CDSCO figures, only 107 
government approvals for new trials were issued in 2013, as compared to the 
peak of 500 in 2010.101  This reflects a major drop in applications. Both 
academic and industry sponsors have been deterred by the regulatory 
uncertainties, particularly the new compensation rules. In 2013, the US 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) suspended around 40 trials set to take 
place in India.102  Foreign and Indian pharmaceutical firms are reportedly 
shifting their research activities to other countries, including China, Thailand 
and Malaysia. 103   The Chinese government, in particular, has welcomed 
foreign-sponsored trials for economic reasons.104 Analysts estimate a loss to 
the Indian clinical trial industry of at least US$150-200 million for 2013.105 
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    Concerned by these repercussions, and under pressure from industry 
interest groups, 106  the Indian government has cut back on its reform 
measures. 107  Although the losses sustained in 2013 are perhaps not that 
significant for the Indian economy overall, the promise of future economic 
benefits on the scale of US$1.5 billion per year, as estimated by consultancy 
firm McKinsey,108 may still exert a powerful hold over the calculations of 
policymakers. 109  With regards to compensation, rules published in the 
Gazette of India December 2014 made several modifications to the January 
2013 regulations.110 First, “free medical management shall be given as long 
as required or till such time it is established that the injury is not related to 
the clinical trial, whichever is earlier” (emphasis added). 111  Second, 
compensation for the use of a placebo shall only be payable “if the standard 
of care, though available, was not provided to the subject as per the clinical 
trial protocol”.112 Third, entitlement to compensation for the failure of an 
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investigational product to provide its intended therapeutic effect is also 
limited to cases where the standard of care, though available, was not 
provided to the subject as per the protocol.113 A further notification published 
in in July 2015 watered down the requirement to make an audio-video 
recording of the informed consent process. 114  The new amendments to 
Schedule Y of the Drugs and Cosmetic Rules, 1945 only require audio-visual 
recording of ‘vulnerable subjects’ involved in clinical trials of new chemical 
entities or new molecular entities. Uncertainty surrounds the term ‘vulnerable 
subjects’, which is not sharply defined.115 
    Ongoing debates about the direction of the reforms are linked with Indian 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s explicit commitment to making India an 
easier place in which to do business.116 In line with this objective, in January 
2015, the CDSCO proposed pre-submission meetings between drug 
regulators and stakeholders so as to increase efficiency and further shorten 
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approval times.117 Furthermore, it was announced in June 2016 that the Drugs 
and Cosmetics (Amendment) Bill, submitted to the Indian Parliament in 2013, 
was to be withdrawn. It will be replaced with an entirely new measure that 
better supports the growth of the Indian pharmaceutical sector.118 Shortly 
afterwards in August 2016, a CDSCO circular removed the restriction on 
Indian clinical trial investigators conducting more than three trials at the same 
time.119 Going forward, it remains to be seen how the Indian government will 
reconcile the various interests at stake.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Broader lessons can be drawn from this case study. India’s experience of 
regulating clinical trials suggests that economic and ethical concerns are 
becoming increasingly intertwined. Government actors appear to view 
regulation as an exercise entailing trade-offs between the goals of economic 
development and protecting participants. Furthermore, the sudden exodus of 
clinical trials from India demonstrates that regulatory frameworks are now 
subject to market forces. 
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    It is important to consider how these dynamics might affect the regulation 
of clinical trials in low and middle-income countries. One possible scenario - 
which has been debated in relation to other policy domains - is a ‘race to the 
bottom’.120  This hypothesis is based on two key assumptions. First, high 
regulatory standards are unattractive to firms because they increase operating 
costs and reduce profits. Multinationals will therefore invest in countries with 
weaker regulatory standards. Second, host countries compete for investment 
by lowering standards; either in terms of the laws on the books or their 
willingness to enforce them.121 The end result is that all competing nations 
implement the lowest possible regulatory standards. Arguably, however, this 
dystopian vision is improbable in the context of Indian clinical trials. 
    There are several reasons why a straightforward race to the bottom is 
unlikely. First, India has a vigorous free press and active civil society groups. 
Both would likely act to highlight social problems and press for change. 
Second, the Indian Supreme Court is receptive to public interest litigation and 
prepared to hold the powerful to account when upholding constitutional rights. 
Third, the Indian government is not preoccupied solely with advancing 
commercial interests. Fourth, and zooming out to the international level, it is 
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far from clear that a race to the bottom amongst clinical trial host countries 
would be desirable to industry. Clinical trials that violate ethical guidelines 
expose their sponsors to risks. Reputation and brand image can be tarnished 
following adverse publicity. In addition, costly trial data could be rejected on 
ethical grounds by regulatory bodies such as the US FDA or the European 
Medicines Agency. If anything, these structural factors could lead towards 
better enforcement of internationally accepted research ethics standards in 
low and middle-income countries over time. 
    Assuming that global industry does indeed have a preference for well-run 
trials, then a more optimistic picture emerges. India might be able to 
implement reforms that better protect trial participants and still attract inward 
investment. Foreign sponsors may be undeterred by regulatory changes that 
impose only modest cost increases. Indeed, a small premium could be viewed 
as worth paying for outsourced clinical trials that comply fully with GCP 
standards. Such trials are far less likely to embroil sponsors in unwanted 
ethical controversies. It follows that if the Indian government simply trims 
back on the ‘excesses’ of its recent reforms - especially those regarding 
compensation - trials may return to the country; and perhaps in even greater 
numbers.122  
    Yet even if this optimistic reading is correct, the Indian case study also 
reveals some contrary and troubling aspects of the relationship between 
economics and ethics. It highlights the mobile nature of global capital, the 
powerful role of economic forces and the de facto limitations on host 
countries freedom to initiate socially desirable reforms. Cost-conscious 
sponsors and CROs can shift operations to other countries if regulatory 
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reforms are perceived as too burdensome.123 Host countries may therefore 
have little choice but to calibrate their research ethics frameworks to levels 
deemed acceptable to sponsors and CROs.  
    This raises questions about where the dividing line will fall between 
reforms that are commercially viable and those which are not. For example, 
would it be practicable for India to enshrine an obligation for sponsors to give 
participants free access to medicines after completion of a trial; as was 
recommended by the Indian Drugs Technical Advisory Board (DTAB) in 
2015?124 According to the limited ethnographic research, Indian investigators 
and ethics committee members currently treat post-trial provision as a 
business decision that falls to the discretion of the sponsor or CRO. 125 
Formalising this duty could make a major difference to the lives of 
impoverished research participants, but would also make India a more 
expensive and less attractive place to conduct research. The risk of ‘capital 
flight’ arguably makes such a reform extremely hard to implement.126 For the 
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time being at least, India and other host countries may be restricted to 
establishing ‘ethics light’ regulatory frameworks that closely mirror 
international GCP standards.127 The resulting rules will likely meet with the 
approval of sponsors and CROs, but gloss over the structural inequalities that 
underpin the globalisation of clinical trials.  
    It would be beneficial for future research to track the ongoing development 
of the Indian regulatory framework with full awareness of this underlying 
policy tension. In addition, a number of reforms remain in place even after 
the initiation and subsequent dilution of policy measures from 2013 onwards. 
These include the new procedure for assessing the causal relationship 
between clinical trial participation, injuries and deaths;128 the involvement of 
an independent Expert Committee to assess causality;129 new responsibilities 
for ethics committees and new procedures for their formal registration;130 the 
revised compensation formulas for determining the quantum of damages for 
clinical trial-related death131  or injury;132  and the new three-tier approval 
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procedure for clinical trials at the CDSCO133 using the three major criteria 
suggested originally by the Supreme Court.134 Further studies assessing how 
the reforms are actually being put into effect and whether they are achieving 
their desired ends would also be helpful additions to the literature.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This article has given an overview of recent regulatory developments in India 
and made two main observations. First, research ethics frameworks and 
economic concerns are increasingly bound together in problematic ways. 
Although host countries are, in theory, free to initiate reforms that improve 
the lot of clinical trial participants, doing so may make a country less 
attractive to sponsors, who can relocate elsewhere. Host countries may 
therefore need to give significant weight to commercial considerations when 
(re)designing regulatory regimes. In this way, economic logic comes to shape 
thinking about ethical issues. 
    The second contribution of the paper was to consider the implications of 
this policy dynamic. The possibility of a ‘race to the bottom’ was discussed, 
but discounted because of the presence of various structural factors. More 
likely is a situation where host countries are restricted to a kind of ethical 
middle ground. Sponsors may welcome improved compliance with some 
basic ethical requirements, such as informed consent. However, other socially 
                                                          
http://www.cdsco.nic.in/writereaddata/ORDER and Formula to Determine the quantum of 
compensation in the cases of Clinical Trial related serious Adverse Events(SAEs) of Injury 
other than Death.pdf [Accessed 20 April 2017]. 
133 Bhave & Menon, op. cit. note 118. 
134 Bhatt, op. cit. note 87. 
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desirable reforms that would increase costs significantly - such as the post-
trial provision of drugs - may be discouraged. Questions of whether and how 
to advance beyond this paradigm are of major concern. This article has 
offered a framework for better understanding the position of clinical trial host 
countries in relation to such challenges. 
 
 
